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CONSTRUCTION ACCIDENTS
USING FUZZY CONCEPTS AND
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ABSTRACT
The accident factor identification and risk assessment is an
essential requirement for prevention of major construction accidents in the construction project process. An integrated quantitative risk assessment (IQRA) method has been proposed in
this paper to overcome the problems of difficult to quantify
accident probability for construction industry. The proposed
approach employs influence diagram and fuzzy theory to estimate accident probability and to deal with the imprecision
inherent to the process of subjective judgment. A case study
that evaluates accident probability of diaphragm wall collapse
is presented to illustrate the use of this methodology and to
demonstrate its capability.

I. INTRODUCTION
The construction industry typically has a higher accident
rate than other industries. Direct and indirect losses generated by major construction accidents reduce profits and can
cause management crises. Such losses significantly impact
construction business owners, workers, clients and the public.
Developing accident prevention strategies and examining
accident risks has become increasingly important [16]. As
selection of personnel, material, machines and safety plan
affects accident risk level and is closely related to total construction cost, an accident quantitative risk analysis (QRA)
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method that considers construction conditions can be extremely useful in performing safety and economic analysis for
planning prevention strategies of major accidents.
Working environments differ markedly between the construction and manufacturing industries. The working environment of the manufacturing industry is characterized by
certain working areas and operational processes, and forms a
relatively closed system in which the quantitative analysis of
accident risk can depend on accident statistics and historical
data. Conversely, individual construction project environments
are usually outdoor, open and unique systems. Directors, operators, machinery, equipment and working environments
change between projects. Therefore, gathering accident data
from previous construction projects to predict quantitative risk
for specific construction accidents in current projects is difficult. Additionally, accident causal factors (e.g., personnel,
machinery, materials, construction methods, geography, geology, and weather conditions) are numerous, complex and
highly interdependent. The QRA technique commonly used in
the manufacturing industry (e.g., fault tree analysis and event
tree analysis.) is unsuitable for construction accident analysis.
The main goal of this study is to create an accident IQRA tool
integrating accident causation theory, influence diagrams and
fuzzy theory for use in safety analysis, influence factors analysis and economic analysis for accident prevention strategy
planning.
This study highly focuses on developing a IQRA methodology that can quantify the probability of a specific construction accident. The QRA methodology can be used to perform
safety and economic analysis for optimizing accident prevention strategy. For ambiguous and complex construction accident situations, it is often difficult to collect useful historic
data for QRA of construction accidents. This study creates a
hierarchical fuzzy system that applies accident causation theory, influence diagrams and fuzzy theory for analyzing accident causal relationships and quantifying accident probability.
Experts can assist in developing accident factor influence
diagram, assessing the conditions of accident causal factors,
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developing fuzzy rule bases of a hierarchical fuzzy system and
predicting accident costs.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Few studies have applied quantitative analysis to assess the
risk of a specific accident in construction operations. Ayyub
and Haldar [2] used fuzzy theory to assess the quantitative risk
of failure of construction alternatives, and considered worker
skill, supervisor experience and falsework condition as the
three principal factors affecting construction operation safety,
for selecting the most desirable construction strategy. Lee and
Halpin [17] used the same method and three accident causal
factors to predict the probability of accidents in utility-trenching operations via fuzzy relations and fuzzy probability [37].
Fuzzy probability was finally normalized to a mean value to
perform sensitivity analysis for the various factors. These
methods focus on risk causal factor selection and use selected
fuzzy membership function of probability to forecast the
probability of failure or accidents in operations. In practice,
the quantitative risk analysis involved in specific accidents is
very useful in the safety and economic analysis of accident
prevention strategies.
Besides these construction accident risk studies, Tanaka et
al. [30] proposed using fuzzy sets defined in a probability
space to determine system failure in a fault tree model according to the extension principal. Singer [23] applied a fuzzy
set approach to fault tree and reliability analysis, and discussed
the tolerances of the probability values of hazard events in
complex systems. Suresh et al. [26] presented a fuzzy methodology for ranking system components or basic events based
on their contribution to the top event failure probability and
the uncertainty of the top event. Tah and Carr [28, 29] applied
fuzzy logic and a hierarchical risk breakdown structure to develop a formal model for construction project QRA. Cho et al.
[5] proposed a fuzzy-based uncertainty model for risk assessment for considering the uncertainty range that represented the
degree of uncertainty of both probabilistic parameter estimates
and subjective judgments. Choi et al. [6] applied this model to
design a software for risk assessment of underground construction projects. Etienne [10] enabled a procedure to import
arguments from post-accident studies and to combine them
with empirical data on normal operational organizations in
order to produce relative measures of reliability. Dağdeviren
et al. [9] proposed a fuzzy analytic network process model to
identify faulty behavior risk in work system.
Many studies have discussed accident causation theories
for various industries and are important for risk analysis. During the 1930s, Heinrich [11] first proposed the Domino Theory and considered five factors in accident sequences. The
accident sequence is that human behavior deficiencies, preceded and influenced by social and environmental factors,
might lead to an unsafe state, accident, and injury. Unsafe
states are described as “unsafe acts and mechanical hazards”
that are central in the accident sequence and are key to re-

moving the effectiveness of preceding factors. Weaver [32]
used “unsafe act and/or condition” as the central domino for
modifying the domino theory of Heinrich. Unsafe acts and
conditions are generally traceable to poor management policies and decisions, in addition to personal and environmental
factors [34]. Nishishima [19] introduced a fishbone model to
describe the accident causation process, in which four related
factors generate unsafe states and unsafe behaviors. These
factors include human, equipment, work, and management.
Bellamy and Geyer [3] proposed a sociotechnical pyramid
model of accident causation, which consists of five causal
factors: engineering reliability, operator reliability, communication and feedback control, organization and management,
and psychological climate.
In the construction industry, Hinze [12] proposed a distraction theory based on the assumption that accident risk may
result from work distractions caused by physical hazards or
mental diversions. Suraji et al. [25] developed a constraint-response model that describes the constraints and responses
experienced by parties involved in project conception, design,
and construction, which may affect accident causation. This
model considers both proximal and distal factors (e.g., operative factors, site environment and work systems, and project
management and organizational issues). Choudhry and Fang
[7] identified some influence factors (e.g., safety procedure,
experience, and education) on the safety behavior of construction workers.
The literature review reaches the following conclusions:
1. Previous discussions of construction accident risk focused
on failure or accidents in operations using a probabilistic
perspective. Few studies have examined specific accident
risks by adopting quantitative perspectives. In practice, the
quantitative analysis involved in specific accidents is very
useful in the safety and economic analysis of accident prevention strategies.
2. For construction projects that have open, unique and complex systems, accumulating suitable historical data to conduct accident QRA becomes difficult. Previous studies
indicate that expert judgment and fuzzy theory can be applied in risk analysis.
3. General QRA methods such as fault tree analysis (FTA) or
event tree analysis (ETA) must precisely analyze the causal
relationships involved in risk events; however, because of
the openness, uniqueness and complexity of construction
projects, establishing analytical causal relationships for accident scenarios is difficult. Some studies have applied
fuzzy relations to establish causal relationships for accident
risk analysis considering few influence factors.
4. Most accident causation theories share the common concept that direct and proximal causal factors are unsafe acts
and conditions, and can be further analyzed as resulting
from three primary failures, namely poor conditions of
humans (e.g., skill and experience of labor and director),
engineering (e.g., equipment, material, machine, working
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Fig. 1. The main steps of quantitative risk analysis for accident probability.

method), and working environment (e.g., site condition,
weather). Therefore, the measurement and improvement of
the safety performances of these causal factors are essential
to risk analysis and accident prevention on working sites.

III. METHODOLOGY
This study proposes a quantitative analysis methodology
focused on major accident probability to perform risk and
safety analysis for preventing construction accidents. This
methodology combines accident causation theory, influence
diagrams and fuzzy theory to quantify accident probability
based on expert judgment. Fig. 1 shows the main steps of quantitative risk analysis for accident probability.
1. Establishment of Accident Causal Relationships Using
Influence Diagrams and Fuzzy Systems
Based on the accident causation, this study utilizes influence diagrams and fuzzy theory to develop a hierarchical
structure of accident causal relationships for further risk assessment. The influence diagram, proposed by Howard and
Matheson [13], is applied early for strategy analysis and mainly
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indicates the relationships among related influential factors.
Ashley and Bonner [1] used influence diagrams to illustrate
the status and interactive influential relationships of risk factors for construction project risk analysis. Afterwards, this
tool is applied to risk analysis, decision analysis, and probabilistic inference. This study utilizes influence diagrams to
organize accident causal factors to describe the possibility of a
specific accident that may occur during construction. In this
study, the possibility is the subjective measure of likelihood
defined in the fuzzy concept for further quantification of accident probability. Based on accident causation theory, the
direct influence factors on accident possibility are the possibility of on-site unsafe acts and conditions. These two factors
are closely related to the states of on-site working conditions
and work personnel. That is, the worse the states of working
conditions and work personnel, the higher the possibility of
unsafe conditions and acts and the higher the relative accident
possibility. Working conditions and working personnel can be
further divided into many on-site and human factors. For example, engineering and environmental states form the state of
working conditions, and the states of operators and directors,
two key parties involved in construction sites, form the state of
work personnel. These factors can be hierarchically divided
into many detailed factors (e.g., performances of temporary
structures, machines and materials, conditions of site geology,
geography and weather, skills and experience of operators, and
directors, etc.) based on expert judgments and project attributes. The upside of Fig. 2 shows an example of the influence
diagram organizing accident and causal factors. These factors
are variables whose states influence subsequent accidents and
are easily expressed by linguistic terms such as very good,
good, medium, and so on. Fuzzy theory thus can play a fundamental role in formulating quantitative linguistic variables
by fuzzy sets, and can also deduce the relationships among
causal factors using fuzzy logic. This study combines influence diagrams and fuzzy theory to develop the influence diagram of accident possibility using the hierarchical fuzzy system, called the hierarchical fuzzy influence diagram (HFID)
here. The downside of Fig. 2 displays the example of a HFID
by adding fuzzy engine nodes following each causal factor
which is impacted by other factors. HFID helps in analytically
developing the hierarchical structure of accident causal relationships based on accident causation theory and solves the
rule-explosion problem (i.e., the number of rules increases exponentially with the number of input variables to the fuzzy
controller) of a multi-variable (i.e. high-dimensional) fuzzy
system using a hierarchical fuzzy system comprising low-dimension fuzzy systems. Previous studies have demonstrated
that the number of rules in the hierarchical fuzzy system increases linearly with the number of input variables, and that
the hierarchical fuzzy system can approximate any nonlinear
function on a compact set to arbitrary accuracy [31]. HFID
thus forms the basis of the quantification of accident probability by operations of the hierarchical fuzzy system in this
study.
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Fig. 2. Inference of accident possibility using hierarchical fuzzy influence diagram. (The upside of Fig. 2 shows an example of the influence diagram
organizing accident and causal factors. The downside of Fig. 2 displays the example of a HFID by adding fuzzy engine nodes following each
causal factor which is impacted by other factors.)

2. Calculation of Accident Possibility by Hierarchical
Fuzzy Systems
The concepts of fuzzy theory and fuzzy systems were proposed by Zadeh [35, 36]. Generally, a fuzzy system is any
system whose variables (or at least some of them) range over
states that are fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets here are fuzzy numbers,
and the associated variables are linguistic variables. Representing states of variables using fuzzy sets is a way of quantifying the variables. The most successful area of application
of fuzzy systems has undoubtedly been the area of fuzzy
control; this area is used to evaluate accident likelihood for
purposes of safety and economic analysis in developing accident control strategies in this study. A general fuzzy controller consists of four modules: a fuzzy rule base, a fuzzy

inference engine, and fuzzification/defuzzification modules.
Fig. 3 presents a general fuzzy controller with two-input variables and one-output variable.
Although fuzzy control techniques have been successfully
applied to various problems, applications are usually limited
to systems with few input variables. A fundamental limitation
of standard fuzzy controllers is that the number of fuzzy rules
increases exponentially with the number of input variables.
This phenomenon was called by Bellman [4] the “curse of
dimensionality”. The rule base rapidly overloads the memory
and makes the fuzzy controller unimplementable. For example, with 8 input variables and 7 fuzzy sets defined for each
variable, the number of fuzzy rules is 78 = 5764801. This
problem can be solved by using hierarchical fuzzy systems. If

Y.-H. Lin et al.: Integrated Quantitative Risk Analysis Method for Major Construction Accidents

Fuzzy Rule
Base
Input

Fuzzification
Module

Fuzzy
Inference
Engine

Defuzzification
Module

Output

Fig. 3. Fuzzy controller with two-input variables, one-output variables
and four modules (a fuzzy rule base, a fuzzy inference engine, fuzzification, and defuzzification modules).

the 8-variable fuzzy system is reduced into a hierarchical fuzzy
system comprising ten hierarchically connected low-dimensional fuzzy systems as shown in Fig. 2, the number of fuzzy
rules reduces to 10 × 72 = 490. Previous studies have demonstrated that hierarchical fuzzy systems with decomposed
low-dimensional fuzzy systems can approximate any nonlinear function to arbitrary accuracy [15, 31]. Hierarchical fuzzy
systems can be applied to more complex systems, such as the
systems of accident causal relationships in this study.
A hierarchical fuzzy system operates by repeating a cycle of
four-step operations (shown as Fig. 3) in each fuzzy controller
within the system from bottom to top. The input and output
variables of each fuzzy controller are all linguistic variables
and the state of each variable is a linguistic expression of each
expert opinion from a macroscopic point of view. One advantage of using linguistic variables is that such expressions
are more intuitive and make it easier for experts to give their
opinions in ambiguous and complex situations in which numerical estimations are hard to obtain. According to Wickens
[33], the typical estimate of human working memory capacity
is 7 ± 2 chunks, meaning humans can effectively make 5-9
comparisons at a time. This study assesses the state of each
input factor (i.e. linguistic variable) using seven linguistic
values {“Very High (Good)”, “High (Good)”, “Fairly High
(Good)”, ” Medium”, ”Fairly Low (Bad)”, “Low (Bad)”,
“Very Low (Bad)”}:
Very High (Good) = VH/VG = u(x, 0.085, 1);
High (Good) = H/G = u(x, 0.085, 5/6),
Fairly High (Good) = FH/FG = u (x, 0.085, 4/6);
Medium = M = u(x, 0.085, 3/6),
Fairly Low (Bad) = FL/FB = u(x, 0.085, 2/6);

(1)

Low (Bad) = L/B = u(x, 0.085, 1/6),
Very Low (Bad) = VL/VB = u(x, 0.085, 0).
where u ( x,σ , c) = e

− ( x −c )2
2σ 2

The symmetric Gaussian function, shown as Eq. (1), is selected as the membership function of each input variable, and

Membership grade (u)

Fuzzy Controller
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1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

L/B

0.1

0.2

FL/FB

M

FH/FG
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1

Fig. 4. Gaussian membership functions of linguistic variables (where
u(x, 0.085, c) = e

− ( x − c )2
2σ 2

, c = {0,1/6,2/6,3/6,4/6,5/6,1}).

forms the fuzzy sets shown in Fig. 4. First, measurements are
taken of all input variables representing relevant states of
causal factors. Next, these measurements are converted into
appropriate fuzzy sets to express measurement uncertainty.
This step is called fuzzification.
The fuzzified measurements are then used by the inference
engine to evaluate whether each rule stored in the fuzzy rule base
is triggered. Each rule is a logical inference regarding the states
of input and output variables. Fig. 5 illustrates the fuzzy rule base
in matrix form. The fuzzy logic if-then rule performs approximate reasoning using imprecise or vague dependencies and
commands [37], in which the antecedent and consequent are
propositions containing linguistic variables, and has the following form:
If X1 is Ai1 … and Xn is Ain then Y is Bi, i = 1, …, m

(2)

where n = number of input variables X = {X 1, ..., X n} and m =
number of rules; Aij and Bi are linguistic values of X and Y,
respectively. In Fig. 5, n = 2, m = 7 × 7 = 49.
Next, the fuzzy inference engine calculates the rule strength
or level of firing of the antecedents (inputs) “If X1 is Ai1 … and
Xn is Ain” for aggregating all the rules triggered to produce one
output membership function. The most commonly seen fuzzy
inference methods are those of Mamdani [18] and Sugeno
[24]. The main difference between the Mamdani and Sugeno
methods of fuzzy inference is that in the Sugeno method the
output membership functions must be linear or constant. Because of the linear dependence of each rule on the system input
variables, the Sugeno method is ideally suited to the task of
smoothly interpolating the linear gains that would be applied
across the input space. The Sugeno system is suited for modeling nonlinear systems by interpolating multiple linear models. This study selects the Sugeno method as the fuzzy inference engine, and the membership functions of the seven
linguistic values of each output variable are a set of constants
(i.e. B = {“VH/VG”, “H/G”, “FH/FG”, ”M”, ”FL/FB”, “L/B”,
“VL/VB”} = {1, 5/6, 4/6, 3/6, 2/6, 1/6, 0}).
The rule strength can be derived using the composition
conjunction, as follows:

Journal of Marine Science and Technology, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2011)

388

Output
Factor Y

F.C.
Input Factor
X2
Input
Factor X2

Input Factor X1

Output Factor
Y

Input
Factor X1

VL

L

FL

M

FH

H

VH

VL

VL

VL

L

L

FL

FL

M

L

VL

VL

L

FL

FL

M

M

FL

L

L

FL

FL

M

M

FH
H

M

L

L

FL

M

M

FH

FH

L

FL

FL

M

FH

H

H

H

L

FL

M

FH

FH

H

VH

VH

FL

FL

M

FH

H

H

VH

Fig. 5. Illustration of the fuzzy rule base in matrix form based on a fuzzy controller with two-input variables and one-output variables.

Variable 1

Variable 2

u

u

u
B1

A12

A11
Rule 1

uA12(x2)

uA11(x1)
x1

min{w1, B1}

w1
x2

X1

Y

X2

u

min
u

u
A21

A22

Rule 2

uagg(y)= max{min{w1, B1}, min{w2, B2}}

u
B2

uA22(x2)

uA21(x1)

Aggregation
min{w2, B2}

w2

Y
Defuzzification

x1

x2

X1

Y

X2

Y0 =

min
If

Then

∑ yuagg(y)
∑ uagg(y)

Aggregation

Fig. 6. Operation of the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference engine and the defuzzification using the center of gravity method (COG).

wi = min[uAi1(x1), uAi2(x2), ..., uAin(xn)]

(3)

The Sugeno-type fuzzy inference engine finally generates
one output associated with membership function uagg(y) using
a conjunction operation on the rule strength (wi) and the constant for the linguistic value of the consequent.
uagg(y) = max{min[w1, B1], min[w2, B2], …, min[wm,Bm]} (4)
The output uagg(y) of the Sugeno-type fuzzy inference
engine has to be expressed by a crisp value for the next operation of the fuzzy controller. This study adopts the center of
gravity method (COG) for the defuzzification:
m

Y0 =

∑yu
i =1
m

i agg

( yi )

∑ uagg ( yi )
i =1

(5)

Fig. 6 illustrates the operation of the Sugen-type fuzzy inference engine and defuzzification method.
To more reliably assess the accident possibility with linguistic variables, it is necessary to aggregate the opinions of
multiple experts. Numerous methods are available for aggregating expert opinions, such as voting, arithmetic averaging,
fuzzy preference relations, the max-min Delphi method, and
the fuzzy Delphi method. However, no firm theoretical guidance can be provided for choosing the most suitable method
[14]. The arithmetic averaging operation satisfies two characteristics of rational combination [8]: (a) a small variation in
any possibility distribution does not noticeably impact the
combined possibility distribution; and (b) when experts are
equally weighted it can also include weights that indicate the
relative importance of different experts. The arithmetic averaging operation is also the most commonly used. Thus,
arithmetic averaging is used to aggregate expert judgments
regarding the input variables and fuzzy rules. That is, the
weight of the estimation of each expert regarding linguistic
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value and fuzzy rules equals 1/p, where p = the number of experts involved in the assessment.

of construction systems, this study assigns 10-2 as the safety
criterion (Psc).

3. Quantification of Accident Probability
To perform quantitative safety and economic analysis of
accident prevention strategies, a transformation is required to
convert the subjective accident possibility into the relatively
objective accident probability. Onisawa [20-22] has proposed
a function which can be used to convert these two measurements. This function is derived by satisfying certain properties such as the proportionality of human sensation to the
logarithmic value of a physical quantity [14]. The accident
probability can then be obtained from the accident possibility,
as follows:

IV. CASE STUDY

Pb = 1/10M, when Ps ≠ 0,
Pb = 0, when Ps = 0,

(6)

M = (1/ Ps-1)1/3 × log(1/Psc),
where Pb ≡ failure probability, Ps ≡ failure possibility, Psc ≡
safety criterion.
Safety criterion denotes the probability that can be used as a
standard to assess operating safety via comparison with the
predictive accident probability. If the accident probability
exceeds the safety criterion, the on-site operation is less safe,
and vice versa. Safety criterion value is generally an experience value based on historic data, expert judgment and enterprise risk taking ability. Swain and Guttmann [27] suggested
that the routine error rate is 10-2-10-3 and the lower bound error
rate is 5 × 10-5. Based on the high error rate and low reliability

A practical case study is used to illustrate the application of
the accident IQRA tool. The case involves considering the
collapse risk of diaphragm walls during an underground deep
excavation operation. The collapse accident may lead to
catastrophic consequences to construction companies; hence
quantitative analysis of accident probability is very important
for further safety analysis, economic analysis and decisionmaking related to accident prevention strategies.
The first step of performing IQRA is to use the proposed
accident probability quantification methodology. Four experts
were consulted for modeling accident causal relationships.
Based on the accident scenario and the practical experiences
of experts, six principal causal factors were proposed as bottom factors for further developing an accident HFID. Fig. 7
shows an integrated accident risk influence diagram based on
accident causation theory and the application of the hierarchical fuzzy system.
Each expert must provide a fuzzy rule base for each fuzzy
controller according to the accident risk influence diagram
shown in Fig. 7. The diagram contains seven fuzzy controllers
and Table 1 shows the 6th fuzzy controller’s rule base provided by one of four experts. The final fuzzy rule base associated with each fuzzy controller is an aggregation of four
expert rule bases where the weight of each rule equals 1/4.
Table 2 lists four expert judgments regarding the linguistic
values of six accident causal factors. Each representative
value is defuzzified from a fuzzy set obtained by averaging
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Table 1. Example of a fuzzy rule base provided by one of four experts represents the 6th controller shown in Fig. 7 with
two input variables (geology stability and excavation depth) and one output variable (site condition).
Site condition

Excavation depth

VL
L
FL
M
FH
H
VH

VB
FB
FB
B
B
B
VB
VB

B
M
FB
FB
B
B
VB
VB

FB
FG
M
M
FB
B
B
VB

Geology stability
M
G
FG
FG
M
FB
FB
B

FG
G
G
FG
FG
M
FB
B

G
VG
G
G
FG
M
FB
B

VG
VG
VG
G
G
FG
M
FB

Table 2. States of six accident causal factors assessed by four experts and their representative values defuzzified from a
fuzzy set obtained by averaging four experts’ membership functions.
Accident causal factor
Geology stability
Excavation depth
Diaphragm wall performance
Support performance
State of directors
State of operators

Expert A
B
H
M
FG
FG
FG

Expert B
FB
FH
M
G
G
FG

Expert C
FB
H
FG
G
FG
FG

Expert D
M
FH
M
G
FG
M

Representative value
0.333
0.750
0.542
0.792
0.708
0.625

Based on the above analysis, the accident probability expected value of 0.1071 exceeds the value of safety criterion,
which is assigned a value of 0.01 in this study, implying that
the current condition of construction operation in the example
presented here is unsafe and an unacceptable risk of collapse
exists. Using this tool to conduct follow-up safety analysis,
influence factors analysis and economic analysis will be necessary and applicable.

V. CONCLUSIONS
Fig. 8. Operation of the hierarchical fuzzy system designed using the
accident hierarchical fuzzy influence diagram shown in Fig. 7.

these membership functions for expressing the linguistic values
of the judgments of four experts on the state of each input
variable. Using these representative values as input, hierarchical fuzzy system operations can be initiated to calculate
accident probability.
To obtain the expected value of quantitative accident
probability, this study designed a graphical user interface
program to efficiently calculate the hierarchical fuzzy system
using Fuzzy Logic Toolbox and Simulink Toolbox built in
MATLAB, a numerical computing environment and programming language created by MathWorks, Inc. Fig. 8 illustrates the inner operations of the hierarchical fuzzy system
designed using the accident HFID shown in Fig. 7. In this
example program calculation is used to obtain the final accident probability expected value of 0.1071.

This study combines fuzzy theory, HFID and probability-possibility convertible functions to generate a novel quantitative approach based on expert judgment. The construction
industry is a high-risk business in which major accidents can
cause large direct and indirect losses. Besides preventing
common injuries (e.g., falls and electrical shocks) to general
laborers, it is extremely important to prevent major construction accidents (e.g. collapses). Historically, few risk assessments focused on QRA of accident probability. Enterprises
can use this developed tool to conduct accident IQRA, influence factors analysis, safety analysis and economic analysis.
As construction sites are typically open outdoor systems,
each construction project is unique. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to use accident data from previous construction projects to predict the quantitative risk for a specific accident. Furthermore, the relationships among accident causal
factors in the construction industry are extremely complex and
fuzzy; that is, it is difficult to use general QRA methods, such
as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis, to define rela-
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tively analytical causal relationship. This study adopts an
overall perspective and emphasizes that the application of the
qualitative accident causation model and subjective expert
judgment can simplify hard-to-quantify problems involved in
construction accident risk assessment.
This study utilizes accident causation theory to establish a
HFID for accident risk analysis. The proposed method can
conduct risk assessment of multiple factors with minimum
fuzzy rule number requirements. The application of expert
judgments and the convertible functions between possibility
and probability help transform a subjective possibility measure into a quantitative probability scale capable of overcoming
problems of insufficient data or complex systems. The proposed method can allow many experts to perform accident
IQRA simultaneously also matches the practice of safety assessment conducted by multiple experts on construction sites.
Thus it is possible to achieve improved objectivity of accident
IQRA.
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